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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Boyd'
(decided April 17, 2008)
Paul Boyd was charged with four counts of robbery in the
first and second degrees. 2 In exchange for his guilty plea, the Su-
preme Court of New York County sentenced him to twelve year con-
current sentences on each count, but failed to impose a determinate
period of postrelease supervision that would follow his incarceration.'
Instead, the court merely informed the defendant that such postre-
lease supervision was mandatory.4 Boyd appealed to the Appellate
Division, First Department, arguing that the trial court violated his
rights pursuant to the Due Process Clause under the U.S Constitution 5
and the New York Constitution,6 "by failing to apprise him of the
range of the mandatory period of postrelease supervision and the du-
ration of supervision to which he [was] subject.",7 Accordingly, the
appellate division addressed whether a defendant can knowingly and
intelligently enter into a plea agreement when the trial judge failed to
inform the defendant of "the duration of postrelease supervision to
' 856 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008), affid as modified, 2009 WL 1227872
(N.Y. May 7, 2009).
2 Id. at 72.
3 Id. at 72-73.
4aid.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty or property without due process of law."
7 Boyd, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
1
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which he is subject upon his release from incarceration or even the
limits imposed by statute on that period of supervision." 8 Ultimately,
the appellate division vacated the defendant's plea, concluding that
he was deprived of due process when he entered into a plea agree-
ment without being apprised of the duration of postrelease supervi-
sion that might be imposed.9
Boyd decided not to defend the charges against him at trial,
and instead satisfied the entire indictment when he pled guilty to the
counts of first-degree robbery. I0 At his plea allocution, it was deter-
mined that Boyd "was not a predicate felony offender."'1  When a
criminal defendant is charged with a Class B or Class C violent fel-
ony, New York Penal Law provides that a defendant "who is not a
predicate felony offender is subject to mandatory postrelease supervi-
sion ranging from 2 1/2 to 5 years, at the court's discretion."' 2 Boyd
was not advised of a determinate period of postrelease supervision
that would follow his incarceration; rather the court merely informed
him that postrelease supervision was mandatory.
13
Boyd appealed, requesting that the appellate division "reverse
his conviction and vacate [his] plea[]" pursuant to section 440.1014 of
8 Id.
9 Id. at 76.
10 Id. at 72.
11 Id.
12 Boyd, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 73. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(2)(f) (McKinney 2008) provides
that: "The period of post-release supervision for a determinate sentence ... shall be five
years except that ... such period shall not be less than two and one-half years nor more than
five years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed ... upon conviction
of a class B or class C violent felony offense."
" Boyd, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 72-73.
14 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(l)(h) (McKinney 2005) states that: "At any time after
the entry of judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant,
[Vol. 251222
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the New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL"). 15 Boyd contended
that the trial court violated his due process rights afforded under both
the federal and state constitutions.
6
In opposition to defendant's appeal, the prosecution main-
tained that the defendant's due process rights were not violated be-
cause the trial judge informed him that postrelease supervision was
mandatory.' 7 Additionally, the government argued that even if the
trial court erred, the defendant failed to make a timely objection
"render[ing] any error unpreserved."'' 8 Furthermore, the People pos-
ited that notwithstanding the trial judge's failure to specify the dura-
tion of postrelease supervision, the applicable period of supervision
in light of the charges against defendant and given his criminal his-
tory, is clearly stated in New York's penal law.' 9 Therefore, the de-
fendant had constructive notice of the possible range of postrelease
supervision. °
The appellate division rejected the People's first argument
that the trial court fulfilled its obligation by informing the defendant
vacate such judgment upon the ground that ... [t]he judgment was obtained in violation of a
right of the defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States."
1" Boyd, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. The People argued that the defendant failed to conform with the procedural re-
quirements of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.60(3) (McKinney 2001) which provides that:
"At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court in its discretion may permit a de-
fendant who has entered a plea of guilty to the entire indictment or to part of the indictment,.
•. [may] withdraw such plea, and in such event the entire indictment, as it existed at the time
of such plea, is restored." The People contended that the defendant had ample opportunity to
cure the deficiencies in the plea agreement prior to sentencing, and therefore the defendant's
failure to make a timely objection left him without a remedy pursuant to CPL 220.60(3) or
CPL 440.10. Id.
19 Id.
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that postrelease supervision was mandatory, thereby placing great
emphasis on the trial court's failure to mention the length of postre-
lease supervision that the defendant faced following incarceration.21
Additionally, the appellate division noted that "the People implicitly
concede[d] the illegality of the sentence" when they requested that
the case be remitted back to the trial court for imposition of a deter-
minate period of postrelease supervision.
22
The People's second argument, that the defendant was on
constructive notice of the possible duration of postrelease supervi-
sion, was rejected because the defendant's potential length of super-
vision following incarceration was completely within the discretion
of the trial judge. 23 The specific time period of postrelease supervi-
sion was unknown to the defendant. 24 Moreover, the appellate divi-
sion noted that when determining the constitutionality of a plea
agreement the trial court's transcript must clearly reflect the defen-
dant's understanding of the plea.25 In order for the trial court to meet
this obligation it must provide the defendant with enough pertinent
information so that he may make a knowledgeable and intelligent
choice among the different courses of action available.26
In addition, the appellate division found no merit in the Peo-
ple's argument that the defendant failed to make a timely objection
21 Id.
22 id.
23 Id. at 73-74.
24 id.
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pursuant to CPL 220.60(3).27 Generally, challenging a plea agree-
ment requires the defendant to make a timely objection to either
withdraw the plea pursuant to CPL 220.60(3) or move to vacate the
plea pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(h).28 However, the court stated that
such procedural requirements are not necessary " 'where [the] trial
judge does not fulfill the obligation to advise a defendant of postre-
lease supervision during the plea allocution.' ,29 Implicit in the trial
court's duty to inform the defendant of the totality of the conse-
quences and ramifications of his plea agreement is ensuring that the
defendant enters into such plea knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily.
3°
By rejecting the People's argument that defendant should be
precluded from challenging his plea since he failed to make a timely
objection pursuant to CPL 220.30(3), the court recognized the possi-
ble ramifications of a different disposition. Justice Tom, writing for
the majority, stated that:
A contrary holding would pose an insurmountable di-
lemma, for if a defendant was misinformed concerning
postrelease supervision, he could hardly be expected
to withdraw his plea until he received accurate infor-
mation; and if definitive information was not imparted
until sentence was pronounced, the defendant would
be precluded from withdrawing his plea because a mo-




29 Id. (quoting People v. Louree, 869 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 2007)).
30 Boyd, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
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The fact that there was no objection or motion by the parties
to the trial judge's statement that postrelease supervision was manda-
tory, creates the inference that the parties believed that the postre-
lease supervision component of sentencing required no express action
by the court.3 2 Notwithstanding this crucial misunderstanding, the
court noted that "whether [or not] the period of postrelease supervi-
sion was mandatory or discretionary, the court was obligated to in-
form [the] defendant of the specific period of supervision., 33 Since
the trial court neglected to fulfill its duty in safeguarding the defen-
dant's due process rights by failing to inform the defendant of the du-
ration of postrelease supervision that would follow incarceration, the
appellate division reversed, vacated the plea, and remitted the matter
back to the trial court.
3 4
In reaching this determination, the court reasoned that postre-
lease supervision is a significant aspect of sentencing, and that when
a criminal defendant enters into a plea agreement "the duration of su-
pervision and its relationship to the range provided by statute are...
material to a defendant's ability to intelligently choose among alter-
native courses of action., 35 Additionally, the appellate division de-
termined that the trial court's error during the plea allocution denied
the defendant an opportunity "to negotiate between the time to be
spent under supervision [following incarceration] and the time to be
32 Id.
33 Id.
14 Id. at 76.
35 Boyd, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
1226 [Vol. 25
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served in confinement. '" 36
Justice McGuire respectfully dissented to the majority's opin-
ion on two grounds. First, he argued that the defendant's claim on
appeal was not preserved for review because the defendant failed to
comply with the procedural requirements of CPL 220.60(3). 31 Sec-
ond, Justice McGuire would have deferred a written decision in this
particular matter until the New York Court of Appeals rendered a
disposition on a series of cases involving the threshold issue pre-
sented by defendant to the court.38
The dissent argued that in order for a criminal defendant to
successfully preserve a challenge to the constitutionality of a plea al-
locution, the defendant must meet the procedural requirements of
CPL 220.60(3) or CPL 440.10. 31 It has been recognized by New
York case law that there are two exceptions to the general rule that a
criminal defendant must preserve a challenge to a plea allocution.4 °
The exceptions apply "where the allocution 'clearly casts significant
doubt upon the defendant's guilt or otherwise calls into question the
36 Id.
37 Id. (McGuire, J., dissenting).
38 Id. At the time of the court's disposition in Boyd, there were several cases involving
similar issues as those presented by the defendant that were pending before the New York
Court of Appeals. Therefore, Justice McGuire was reluctant to join the majority's opinion.
However, all of the cases except for one were consolidated and a written disposition was
published on April 29, 2008. See People v. Sparber, 889 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2008) (holding
that a trial judge has a duty to inform criminal defendant's of the period of postrelease su-
pervision at sentencing and that such failure requires the appellate court to vacate the plea
and remit the matter to the trial court for resentencing); In re Garner v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 889 N.E.2d 467 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that post-release supervi-
sion must be pronounced at sentencing and cannot thereafter be imposed by a government
administrative agency).
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voluntariness of the plea.' ,,41 It is clear in Boyd that the first excep-
tion is not implicated by defendant's appeal. However, the second
exception, regarding the voluntariness of the plea, is a crucial issue.
The defendant posited that the second exception to the general
rule of preservation applied because he was not informed of the par-
ticular duration of postrelease supervision, but merely of the fact that
such supervision was mandatory as a result of the charged offense.42
However, it is the dissent's contention that a trial court does not
commit reversible error when it fails to notify a criminal defendant of
the specific duration of postrelease supervision following incarcera-
tion, but that reversible error is applicable only when the sentencing
court does not inform the defendant that a period of supervision is
required.43 Relying on People v. Hill,44 the dissent would hold that a
criminal defendant's due process rights have not been violated unless
" 'at the time of his plea, [the] defendant was not informed that a pe-
riod of postrelease supervision would follow his term of incarcera-
tion.' ,45 Therefore, it is the dissent's position that a failure by the
sentencing judge to inform the criminal defendant of the particular
duration of postrelease supervision does not violate his due process
rights when the defendant is informed that such supervision is man-
datory.46
It is well established that a plea agreement entered into by a
41 Id. (quoting People v. Lopez, 525 N.E.2d 5, 6 (N.Y. 1988)).
42 Id.
41 Id. at 76-77.
44 879 N.E.2d 152 (N.Y. 2007).
4' Boyd, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 76 (McGuire, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Hill, 879
N.E.2d at 155).
46 Id. at 76-77.
1228 [Vol. 25
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criminal defendant must comport with the constitutional requirements
of due process.47 The United States Supreme Court has stated that a
plea complies with due process when it "represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant., 48 Before a court can accept a criminal defendant's plea,
the court must determine whether the defendant is aware of and un-
derstands the consequences of entering into a plea. 49 Additionally, it
has been determined that a criminal defendant need not expressly
admit to the crime with which he is charged in order for the plea to be
considered voluntary.5 ° In North Carolina v. Alford, the defendant
was charged with first-degree murder. 51 The defendant was urged by
counsel to plead guilty in light of the prejudicial evidence against him
and the strength of the prosecution's case.52 Alford decided to plead
guilty to second-degree murder, but he continued to maintain his in-
nocence.53 The Supreme Court upheld Alford's plea agreement after
determining that he voluntarily entered into it.54  The Court noted
that:
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver
of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter
47 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
48 Id.
49 See FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 1 I(b)(1) (2007) which provides that: "Before the court accepts
a plea of guilty... the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
understands ... any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of
supervised release."
50 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
5' Id. at 26.
52 Id. at 27.
53 Id. at 28. Before the plea was accepted, "Alford took the stand and testified that he had
not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the
death penalty if he did not do so." Id.
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element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposi-
tion of criminal penalty. An individual accused of a
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understand-
ingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence
even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participa-
tion in the acts constituting the crime.55
A/ford provided that a defendant's guilty plea will be consid-
ered voluntary and constitutional as long as he is apprised of the
ramifications of pleading guilty.56 However, it has been noted that it
is not necessary for a trial court to inform the defendant of every pos-
sible consequence that may result from a plea agreement and subse-
quent conviction.5 7 For purposes of ensuring that a defendant volun-
tarily and intelligently enters into a plea agreement, courts have
interpreted Rule 1118 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law to re-
quire the sentencing judge to disclose only direct consequences of
sentencing, and not collateral ones.59 In United States v. Brady, the
Supreme Court noted that a plea is voluntary where it is " 'entered
[into] by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecu-
tor, or his own counsel, [and that such plea] must stand unless in-
duced by threats ... , misrepresentation . . . , or perhaps by promises
that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to
5 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
56 Id.
57 United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
58 See FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 1 (b)(1) which provides that: "Before the court accepts a plea
of guilty... the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant under-
stands... any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of super-
vised released."
'9 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
1230 [Vol. 25
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the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).' 5160
The determination of what constitutes a direct or collateral
consequence of a plea "turns on whether the result represents a defi-
nite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the de-
fendant's punishment." 61 Moreover, collateral consequences include
those that are " 'ancillary or consequential results which are peculiar
to the individual and which may flow from a conviction of a plea of
guilty.' ,562 The circuit courts have concluded that consequences like
commitment to a mental facility, 63 loss of good time credit,64 loss of
the rights to vote and travel abroad, 65 and discharge from the armed
forces66 are collateral and need not be disclosed to a criminal defen-
dant. On the other hand, courts have consistently held that the maxi-
mum allowable sentence for the crime charged 67 and the loss of state
probation or parole68 are direct consequences that the sentencing
judge must communicate to the criminal defendant at his plea allocu-
tion.
The imposition of postrelease supervision or a special parole
term has been determined by the federal judiciary to be a direct con-
60 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir.
1957) (Tuttle, J., dissenting)).
61 Cuthrell v. Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).
62 Id. at 1366-67 (quoting United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
The court in Sambro noted that if the trial judge is aware of a possible consequence related
to sentencing, it is within the judge's discretion to determine whether or not to advise the
defendant. Sambro, 454 F.2d at 920.
63 Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366.
64 Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971).
65 Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 380, 381 (5th Cir. 1964).
66 Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
67 Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968).
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sequence of sentencing. 69 In Michel v. United States, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals grappled with the distinction between direct
and collateral consequences. 70 In Michel, the defendant pled guilty to
"knowingly and intentionally ... distributing cocaine.' The district
court judge sentenced Michel to a term of imprisonment of five years
followed by a five year term of special parole. 72 The defendant ap-
pealed the sentence, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.73 On ap-
peal, Michel contended that the plea was not voluntary within Rule
1 1 because he did not understand the imposition of the special parole
term, and because he was not advised that he may be deported as a
result of the conviction.74 The court determined that a term of special
parole is a direct consequence of sentencing because of its similarity
to the concept of parole, noting that "[s]ince special parole adds time
to a regular sentence," and because parole affects the length of a
criminal defendant's sentence, such consequences are direct results of
sentencing.75 Although the court determined that special parole is a
direct consequence requiring disclosure to the criminal defendant, the
court nonetheless held that Michel was adequately advised of the pe-
69 See, e.g, Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1977); Michel v. United
States, 507 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Friedman, 436 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Aviles v. United States, 405 F. Supp 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).





75 Michel, 507 F.2d at 463. See also, Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.
1970), where the Second Circuit stated that, "the unavailability of parole directly affects the
length of time an accused will have to serve in prison" and "that such a major effect on the
length of possible incarceration would have great importance to an accused in considering
whether to plead guilty."
1232 [Vol. 25
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riod of special parole and affirmatively stated that he understood.
7 6
The court rejected Michel's second contention regarding the
trial court's requirement to inform him of the possibility of deporta-
tion, because at the time the plea agreement was entered, Michel was
a resident alien.77 The Second Circuit deferred to precedent and rec-
ognized "that deportation [is] not a direct but rather a collateral con-
sequence of [a defendant's] plea., 78 The court reasoned that since a
separate governmental agency must commence deportation proceed-
ings against the defendant, deportation is not a direct consequence of
a guilty plea, but is collateral and therefore does not impose a duty on
the trial judge to inform the defendant of such ramifications.79
The New York Court of Appeals has recognized a distinction
between direct and collateral consequences of sentencing when de-
termining the constitutionality of a plea allocution. In People v.
Ford,80 the defendant accidentally shot and killed his girlfriend while
he was showing her his gun.8' The defendant, a legal alien from Ja-
maica, pled guilty to second-degree manslaughter.82 Following his
conviction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service commenced
deportation proceedings.8 3 In an attempt to avoid deportation, the de-
fendant appealed his conviction, claiming that he was not informed
76 Michel, 507 F.2d at 464.
77 Id.at 462.
78 Id.
71 Id. at 465.
80 657 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1995).
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that he risked deportation as a result of his conviction. 84 Although his
attempt to appeal his conviction was successful in the state supreme
court, the appellate division and Court of Appeals both upheld the
conviction.
85
The Court of Appeals recognized that a court has a constitu-
tional duty to ensure that a criminal defendant understands the rami-
fications of pleading guilty.86 However, this duty only requires a trial
court to inform the criminal defendant of the direct consequences and
not the collateral consequences of sentencing. 87 In distinguishing be-
tween direct and collateral, the court noted that collateral conse-
quences are the effects of sentencing that "are peculiar to the individ-
ual and generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court
does not control., 88 Relying on both federal and state precedent, the
court rejected the defendant's contention that deportation is a direct
consequence of sentencing. 89 Since the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service is the agency that exercises discretion in determining
whether to pursue such proceedings, such consequences are "not
within the control of the court system."90
Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Van Deusen,91 exemplified the importance of informing a defendant
of the period of postrelease supervision that follows a determinate pe-
84 Id.
85 Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 269.
86 Id. at 267.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 268.
89 Id.
90 Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 268.
9' 853 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 2006).
1234 [Vol. 25
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riod of incarceration. In Van Deusen, the defendant pled guilty to
first-degree robbery in exchange for a period of incarceration be-
tween five and fifteen years.92 At no time during the plea allocution
was the defendant informed that the determinate sentence would be
followed by a mandatory period of postrelease supervision.93 The
trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years' incarceration fol-
lowed by a five year period of postrelease supervision.94 The defen-
dant appealed, arguing that she was denied due process when she was
not informed of the mandatory period of postrelease supervision that
would follow her incarceration.95 In opposition to the appeal, the
prosecution argued that the court should uphold the conviction be-
cause the period of incarceration coupled with the time of postrelease
supervision did not exceed the total amount of time that the defendant
agreed to serve pursuant to the plea agreement.96 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's plea, stating that:
While [the] defendant's sentence . . . , including
postrelease supervision, was actually less than the
maximum potential period of incarceration that she
agreed to serve, . . . [a]t the time defendant pleaded
guilty, she did not possess all the information neces-
sary for an informed choice among different possible
courses of action because she was not told that she
would be subject to mandatory postrelease supervision
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Likewise, in People v. Catu,98 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that postrelease supervision was a significant aspect of
sentencing because of the various conditions that are imposed on a
criminal defendant upon incarceration.99 In Catu, the defendant en-
tered a plea of guilty to "attempted robbery in the second degree and
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol."100
As a result of the plea, the court sentenced the defendant to three
years' incarceration. °1' Additionally, since the defendant was a
predicate felony offender, the court imposed a mandatory five year
period of postrelease supervision, but failed to inform the defendant
of such penalty. 
102
On appeal, the defendant's sole contention was that the court
violated his due process rights by failing to inform him of the direct
consequences of his guilty plea. 0 3 The court recognized that postre-
lease supervision is a consequence directly related to sentencing.1
0 4
The court acknowledged that upon being released after serving his
sentence, the defendant must comply with certain regulations set by
the court. 10 5 Such conduct and regulations include "reporting to a pa-
role officer,... a curfew, restrictions on travel, and substance abuse
testing and treatment."' 1 6 Furthermore, the court noted the serious-
ness of postrelease supervision, stating that any violation of postre-
9' 825 N.E.2d 1081 (N.Y. 2005).
99 Id. at 1082.
'oo Id. at 1081.
1o1 Id.
102 Id.
103 Catu, 825 N.E.2d at 1082-83.
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lease supervision by a criminal defendant "can result in reincarcera-
tion for at least six months and up to the balance of the remaining su-
pervision period."
1'0 7
Similarly, in People v. Goss,10 8 the Appellate Division, Third
Department once again reinforced the notion that a period of postre-
lease supervision that follows a determinate period of incarceration is
a direct consequence of sentencing that a criminal defendant must be
apprised of in order to intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily enter
into a plea agreement.'0 9 In Goss, the defendant entered a plea of
guilty to burglary in the second degree, and was sentenced to twelve
years incarceration followed by a mandatory five years of postrelease
supervision, which he was not informed of at the plea allocution. °
On appeal, the appellate division vacated the defendant's plea. 1 ' The
court recognized that any violation by a criminal defendant while on
postrelease supervision would result in "a significant period of rein-
carceration." 12 Therefore, the court concluded that postrelease su-
pervision is a direct consequence of a criminal defendant's sentenc-
ing. 
113
Both the U.S. Constitution and the New York Constitution af-
ford protections to the criminal defendant through their respective
Due Process Clauses. Although a sentencing judge does not need to
inform a criminal defendant of every possible consequence of sen-
107 Id.
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tencing when entering into a guilty plea, courts have recognized that
such pleas must comport with the Due Process Clause of federal and
state constitutions. A plea comports with the constitutional require-
ments of due process when the defendant fully understands the rami-
fications of entering a guilty plea.
Through years of case law, federal and state courts have de-
termined that a plea agreement is voluntary and consistent with due
process when the sentencing judge informs the criminal defendant of
all the direct consequences of an imposed conviction. Direct conse-
quences are those that have a significant and immediate result of sen-
tencing. Notwithstanding this requirement, sentencing judges are not
required to advise defendants of the collateral consequence of enter-
ing a guilty plea. Such consequences are not an immediate result of
sentencing, but are often the result of action taken by a governmental
agency outside the control of the court.
Although the distinction between direct and collateral conse-
quences of sentencing seems to be clear, it is anything but. Courts
often struggle with determining whether a particular result is a direct
or collateral consequence. Furthermore, there is no definitive list of
what constitutes a direct or collateral consequence. It is important to
note that both federal and state courts place more emphasis on the
immediacy of the result as opposed to the seriousness of a conse-
quence in making the determination between direct and collateral.
For example, postrelease supervision is a direct and immediate con-
sequence of sentencing because it is imposed on the defendant prior
to incarceration. On the other hand, deportation is considered by
1238 [Vol. 25
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many a very serious consequence, but is only collateral as it is im-
posed by a governmental agency following sentencing and is outside
the control of the court.
Additionally, in making the determination between direct and
collateral, federal and state courts consider the particular result in
question. The more unique a consequence is to a particular defen-
dant's situation, the more likely the court is going to deem the conse-
quence collateral. On the other hand, the more widespread the effect
of a consequence on a criminal defendant the more likely the court is
going to be under a duty to advise the defendant of the possibility of
such consequence.
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